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General Hameed Gul

Hamid Gul   born 20 November 1936) HI(M), SBt, is a retired high-ranking general officer in the Pakistan Army, and a former spymaster famous for serving as the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, between 1987 and 1989 during the late stages of and post-stages of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.^[1]Gul is widely known and credited for pressing the hard-line policies on India after starting the insurgency in Kashmir against India in 1989^[2] by diverting the Mujahideen who participated in the Soviet war to Indian-held Kashmir. Gul was also instrumental in the establishment of the Taliban and was once known as the “father of the Taliban”.^[3] Apart from the Kashmir militancy in India and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Gul is also accused by the United States of having ties to Islamic terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda.^[4]

 

Gul’s tenure as the director of the ISI coincided with Benazir Bhutto‘s term as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Later, Gul established the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA). Hamid Gul was born on 20 November 1936 to Muhammad Khan, in the Sargodha District of Punjab in what was then British India but now Pakistan. He got his early education from a school in his village. He briefly got admission in Government College Lahore, before reporting to Pakistan Military Academy Kakul.

Army career

Hamid Gul was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in October 1957 with the 18th PMA Long Course in the 19th Lancers regiment of the Armoured Corps. He was a Tank commander during the 1965 war with India. During 1972–1976, Gul directly served under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as a battalion commander, and then as Staff Colonel, when General Zia was GOC, 1st Armoured Division and Commander, II Corps at Multan. Thus, Gul had already cemented his ties with General Zia by serving under him when both were officers in the Armoured regiments of the II Corps. Gul was promoted to Brigadier in 1978 and steadily rose to be the Martial Law Administrator of Bahawalpur and the Commander of the 1st Armoured Division, Multan in 1982, his appointments expressly wished by Zia himself.^{[citation needed]}

Saudi influence

Gul was then sent to GHQ as the Director-General or DG Military Intelligence (DGMI)^[5] under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq who then nominated him to be the ISI chief succeeding General Akhtar Abdur Rahman in March 1987. He was later replaced as the ISI commander by PM Benazir Bhutto in May 1989 and Gul was transferred as the commander, II Corps in Multan. In this capacity, Gul conducted the Zarb-e-Momin military exercise in November–December 1989, the biggest Pakistani Armed Forces show of muscle since 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.^{[citation needed]}General Asif Nawaz upon taking the reins of Pakistan Army in August 1991, had Gul transferred as the DG Heavy Industries Taxila. A menial job compared to Gul’s stature, Gul refused to take the assignment, an act for which he was retired from the army.^[6]

Career as ISI Chief

Execution of failed Jalalabad operation

During his time as head of the ISI and the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Gul was blamed for planning and executing the operation to capture Jalalabad from the Afghan army in the spring of 1989. This switch to conventional warfare was seen as a mistake by some since the mujahideen did not have the capacity to capture a major city. But the Pakistani army was intent on installing a fundamentalist-dominated government in Afghanistan, with Jalalabad as their provisional capital, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf as Prime Minister, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as Foreign Minister.

 

Contrary to Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters. Conversely, the morale of the mujahideen involved in the attack slumped and many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government.^[7] In the words of Brigadier Mohammad Yousef, an officer of the ISI, “the jihad [meaning the plans for Hekmatyar to be installed as prime minister] never recovered from Jalalabad”. As a result of this failure, Hamid Gul was sacked by Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and replaced by Shamsur Rahman Kallu, who pursued a more classical policy of support to the militants fighting Afghanistan.

Lieutenant-General Shahid Aziz

Shahid Aziz  is a Pakistani military author, intelligence writer, and retired three-star ranking general officer of the Pakistan Army. His military assignments included as the Chief of General Staff (CGS) from October 2001 to December 2003 and Commander of the IV Corps in Lahore from December 2003 to October 2005. After retiring from the military, he was appointed Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau, a post he left in May 2007 albeit amid controversy. ^[1][2][3][4]

Military career

Shahid Aziz is a graduate of National Defence University, Pakistan and was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1969. His military career has placed him in pivotal posts during critical periods in Pakistan. He served as the General Officer Commanding of the 12th Infantry Division stationed in Murree. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, he served as DG of the ISI’s Analysis Wing. That same year, he was appointed to the role of Director General Military Operations where he played a crucial role in the coup that brought Pervez Musharraf to power. After the events of 9/11, he was serving as Chief of General Staff at GHQ when the US deployed its forces to Afghanistan. He finally retired from the army in 2005 after having held the post of Lahore Corps Commander for two years.

Post-retirement

Lt. Gen. (retired) Shahid Aziz, who recently created ripples by acknowledging in an article^[5] that regular troops were involved in the Kargil operation, said the “misadventure” was a “four-man show” and details were initially hidden from the rest of the military commanders. He published a book “Yeh Khamoshi Kahan Tak? Aik Sipahi ki Dastan-e-Ishq o Junoon”(English: How Long Will You Remain Silent? A Soldier’s Saga of Love and Passion). ^[6][7]

Lt. Gen. Aziz is married and father of four children.

Lalak Jan Shaahed

Lalak Jan Shaahed ( 1967 – 7 July 1999) was born in Yasin, in the Ghizer District, of the Northern Areas of Pakistan (now called Gilgit-Baltistan). After school he joined the Pakistan Army, and reached the rank of Havaldar.

Northern Light Infantry deployment

As a junior officer in the Northern Light Infantry, Jan fought against India in the Kargil War of 1999.

Tiger Hill in the Kargil Sector had been occupied by around 130 men of 12th NLI (Northern Light Infantry) unit of the Pakistan Army. These men were under the command of Subedar Sikander, who was given the responsibility to capture Indian territory (which was under Indian control after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971). Havaldar Major Lalak Jan was his 2IC (second in command). The men of 12th NLI were ordered by the Subedar to change their positions while firing back at the Indian forces.

Kargil War

On 1 July 1999, the 18th Grenadiers Battalion (India) launched a fierce attack on Tiger Hill, occupied by the Pakistani Army, under cover of heavy artillery shelling around the bunkers. Subedar Sikandar sneaked across the Line of Control and placed his men in well-entrenched positions, and managed to repulse the attack without any loss of life on their own part. Exact casualty figures for the attacking Indian 18th Grenadiers Battalion, are not available. On the morning of 2 July 1999, hoping to use the cover of the mist, the 18th Grenadiers launched another intense attack on Tiger Hills. Realizing the great difficulty in holding their previous positions that had been spotted and zeroed-in by the Indian artilliery deployed below, Subedar Sikandar ordered his men to retreat to secondary positions around a secret bunker.

 

Once the men were secure, he directed Lalak Jan to descend Tiger Hill and, amidst the Indian Artillery shelling, plant the landmines in the area in front of the Indian forces. Though this was deemed a nearly impossible task by all, the Subedar and the 2IC agreed that this task was very important, if they were to make a dent in the Indian offensive. Planting the landmines was the only way for them to neutralize the Indian armor and artillery, as the men of 12th NLI did not have any heavy/armour-piercing weaponry; their light-attack unguided (RPG-7)s were inadequate for the task. They were hoping that the mist under which’s cover the Indians were attacking, would help Lalak Jan as well, and that the Indians would not be expecting such an audacious and surprising move from the men holed up above.

Mountain combat

Accepting the daunting task, Lalak Jan descended Tiger Hills in the mist. He was provided as fierce a cover as possible, to keep the Indians distracted. Lalak Jan, born and raised in the foothills of the Himalayan Mountain Ranges in northern Pakistan, used his natural mountaineering abilities to the fullest, and managed to plant the landmines in such a manner that the Indians would encounter them as soon as they tried to move forward to new positions higher up towards the hill. Lalak Jan returned to 12th NLI’s position, having successfully completed this mission.

 

The trap was now set; The men had to lure the Indian forces into it. Subedar Sikandar told his men to gradually reduce the firing to a standstill. About two hours after firing ceased from the Pakistan side, the Indians ventured forward, hoping that they’d managed to clear the area of the 12th NLI. The landmines planted by Lalak Jan wrought havoc to their forward movements. The Indians are believed to have suffered many casualties, suffering losses in both men and armor. This incident was not publicized by the Indian side however, due to which the exact amount of damage is not known. The damage was severe enough, in any case, that 18th Grenadiers battalion did not attack the Tiger Hills positions for around half a week, until support arrived in the form of another Indian Unit, eight Sikh.

On 6 July, both the 18th Grenadiers battalion and the 8th Sikh launched a combined attack on Tiger Hills, in what many consider one of the fiercest battles of the Kargil Operation. Detachments of Indian soldiers launched an attack from the very high, steep side of the hills. The 12th NLI was not expecting an attack from this side, and it took them by surprise. The NLI fought this battle at a heavy cost. Over half the 12th NLI unit’s strength was lost in the fighting that ensued, suffering 80 casualties out of the unit’s total strength of around 130. Casualties including Subedar Sikander, who had commanded the unit in this battle so far. In the course of the fighting that ensued, some number of bunker fortifications held by the NLI unit were completely destroyed by the Indians, launching surprise attacks and dropping grenades into them.

 

Towards the end of the engagement, only Havaldar Lalak Jan and three other men remained. The onslaught of the Indians was continuing and they were rapidly advancing towards capturing the hills. Lalak Jan, now the senior most person around, placed his three men in strategic positions, assigning two to three positions per person, and ordering them to rapidly fire from different positions. These men, pitted against an enemy vastly superior in number and weaponry, managed to repulse the Indian onslaught, in a saga of sheer courage and great determination.

 

On 7 July 1999, the 18th Grenadiers battalion and the 8th Sikh unit launched yet another combined offensive. This time they succeeded in their attack. Two of Lalak Jan’s men were killed, and Lalak Jan and his only other remaining comrade in arms, Bakhmal Jan were both seriously injured. Not giving up, Lalak Jan got hold of a LMG and while Bakhmal Jan provided him with the ammunition, and the two men desperately kept trying to repulse the Indian attack. Lalak Jan’s left arm had been rendered useless after receiving bullet wounds to it. Bakhmal Jan, unable to sustain his grave injuries, died while supplying the ammunition to Lalak Jan. After the Indian offensive had subsided, reinforcements (50 to 60 men) were sent to Tiger Hill under Captain Amer. When he saw the condition of Lalak Jan he told him to go back to the base camp on account of his severe injuries, his arm being shot and completely limp, and in no condition to be used. Lalak Jan told the captain that he did not want to die on a hospital bed, and would rather die in the battlefield. He reassured his Captain that he should not worry about the bullet wounds in Lalak’s arm, that Lalak Jan could still be of some use in the battlefield.

 

Around this time, soon after Captain Amer’s reinforcements arrived, the Indians started shelling from a secret, out-of-sight bunker in an adjacent hill. The command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but zeroing in and targeting the bunker proved exceedingly difficult. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by Captain Amer’s forces is not confirmed. Three likely reasons come to mind however. The secret bunker might have been very well designed and protected by the mountainsides, the fire might not have been directed properly or thirdly, the bunker was not in range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.

 

There was only one way left to counter the secret Indian bunker; it had to be blown up from a closer range. Lalak Jan, despite his injuries, volunteered for the mission, but his plea was rejected by the captain. Having significant experience of the mountains himself, the captain was of the opinion that he would be the best man to do it, himself. The captain relented in the end, on Lalak Jan’s persistent insistence that his audacious landmine installation experience and his mountaineering skills would enable him to have a fighting chance to complete this task.

Final combat

Lalak Jan put a bag of explosives on his back, and while shouldering an AK-47 descended Tiger Hills for the second time, again amidst heavy Indian shelling. Managing to avoid being seen by the Indian forces, and utilizing his knowledge of the surrounding hills to take cover, he located the secret bunker and threw the explosives inside the bunker. The bunker, which incidentally was also an ammunition dump, blew up in a very big blast. Lalak Jan managed to take cover, and the Indian Army lost 16 men inside and nearby the bunker. The other Indian soldiers saw Lalak Jan and opened fire on him. Surrounded from all sides by Indian fire, Lalak Jan made a valiant effort to resist and returned fire. He sustained grave injuries, especially as a result of heavy mortar shelling.

Death

On 15 September 1999, the commanding officer of 12th NLI sent two Special Service Group Comando groups to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were designated ‘Ababeel’ and ‘Uqaab'(Eagle). Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan. When his body was found, Havaldar Lalak Jan had his AK-47 firmly clenched to his chest. Pakistan awarded him the Nishan-i-Haider, Pakistan’s highest military award, for extraordinary gallantry. Only ten soldiers have ever received this honour. Jan was the first person from the Northern Areas of Pakistan to receive the award.

Raja Aziz Bhatti

Raja Aziz Bhatti (1928 – 10 September 1965)^[1] was a Staff officer in the Pakistan Army who received Pakistan’s highest award for valor. He was born in Hong Kong in 1928.^[2][3] He moved to Pakistan before it became independent in 1947, living in the village of Ladian, Kharian, Gujrat. There he enlisted with the newly formed Pakistani Army and was commissioned to the Punjab Regiment in 1950.

Death

On 11 September 1965, as a Company Commander in the Burki area of the Lahore sector, Major Raja Aziz Bhatti chose to stay with his forward platoon. His platoon was under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights while defending the strategic BRB Canal. Throughout the encounter, undaunted by constant fire from enemy small arms, tanks, and artillery, he was reorganizing his company and directing the gunners to shell enemy positions. In order to watch every move of the enemy, he had to place himself in an elevated position, where he was exposed to Indian forces. He led his men from the front, under constant attack from Indian Artillery batteries. Although he tried to counter every Indian offensive in his area, he was struck in the chest by an enemy tank shell while watching the enemy’s moves, and was martyred on 11 September 1965.^[1]

Colonel Sher Khan

Colonel Sher Khan was a Pakistan Army officer who is one of only eleven recipients of Pakistan’s highest gallantry award, the Nishan-e-Haider. He was a Captain in the 27 Sindh Regiment of the Pakistan.

Name

Captain Sher Khan was born in Nawan Killi (Shewa Adda), a village in Swabi District of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. Karnal is a localised form of Colonel. Karnel Sher Khan’s home village of Nawan Kali (“New Village”) has now been named after him as Karnal Sher Killi (“Village of Karnal Sher Khan”).

Early life

Captain Sher Khan was the youngest of his two brothers and two sisters.^{[citation needed]} His mother died in 1978 when he was eight. He was brought up by his paternal aunts. His family is deeply religious and they say that Sher was an embodiment of piety and Islamic teaching.^{[citation needed]}

Education and career

After completing his intermediate schooling at the Government College Swabi, he joined the Pakistan Air Force as an airman.^{[citation needed]} On completion of his training, he was appointed electric fitter (aeronautical) at Risalpur. During these years he applied twice for commission in the Pakistan Army as a Commissioned Officer. He succeeded the second time.^{[citation needed]} He joined the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, in November 1992 and graduated in the 90th Long Course in 1994. His first posting was at Okara in 27th Sindh Regiment. Always smiling as a devoted soldier, he was fondly called Shera (Lion) and was very popular among his officers and colleagues.^{[citation needed]} In January 1998 he volunteered to serve at the LoC in Kashmir, he was posted in 12 NLI.

Kargil conflict

Captain Sher Khan was posthumously awarded Pakistan’s highest gallantry award, the Nishan-e-Haider, for his actions during the Kargil Conflict with India in 1999.

The following is the official statement by the Pakistan Army:^[1]

“Captain Karnal Sher Khan emerged as the symbol of mettle and courage during the Kargil conflict on the Line of Control (LoC). He set personal examples of bravery and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. He defended the five strategic posts, which he established with his Jawan‘s at the height of some 17,000 feet at Gultary, and repulsed many Indian attacks. After many abortive attempts, the enemy on July 5 ringed the post of Capt. Sher Khan with the help of two battalion and unleashed heavy Mortar firing and managed to capture some part of the post. Despite facing all odds, he led a counter-attack and tried to re-capture the lost parts. But during the course he was hit by the machine-gun fire and embraced Shahadat or martyrdom at the same post. He is the first officer from the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province to be awarded with Nishan-e-Haider.”

He counterattacked the enemy at Tiger Hill during day when enemy could easily see his movements. It was a surprise for Indian Army as they were not expecting any thing like that. It was considered as a suicide counterattack but being familiar with the positions of that post Karnal Sher was not only successful in forcing the enemy to retreat but also followed them to their base camp and embraced shahadat. ^[2]